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1. Introduction 
When studying how actual decisions of economic policy are made, bilateral or 
trilateral cooperative agreements between unions, employers’ associations and the 
government are often found to be rather common. Policies derived from such 
agreements are generally defined as corporatist (See OECD, 1997; Visser, 1998; 
Traxler and Kittel, 2000; Rhodes, 2001). These agreements often involve many issues 
rather than a specific one. Corporatist policies are claimed to result from the public 
nature of economic stabilization (see the references in Cubitt, 1995). However, the 
underlying reasons and dynamics of such agreements are less clear, and the 
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theoretical literature has only made a few steps to investigate these questions. On the 
contrary, many economists, as e.g. Burda (1997), underline a “formal reticence” of 
researchers to develop models of corporatism.1  
Observed corporatist policies are the result of negotiations among social partners and 
the government. Any analysis of such negotiations requires an understanding of the 
rules that guide the interaction among the participants (Olson, 1965; Keohane, 1984; 
North, 1990; Shepsle and Weingast, 1995). The rules that set the agenda and define 
the procedures of negotiations influence the scope of issues and the process for 
choosing among available alternatives. A powerful tool to formalize the negotiation 
mechanisms is provided by game theory. In particular, cooperative solutions can be 
interpreted as the result of a negotiation process, and the properties of cooperative 
solution concepts summarize the rules that guide the interaction among participants. 
In 1953 John Nash formally defined cooperation as 
“… situations involving two individuals whose interests are neither 
completely opposed nor completely coincident. The word ‘cooperation’ 
is used because the two individuals are supposed to be able to discuss 
the situation and agree on a rational joint plan of action, an agreement 
that should be assumed to be enforceable…” (Nash, 1953: 128). 
The above definition implies that, for cooperation to be implementable, mutual 
benefits for all the cooperating agents are essential. In this paper we apply this idea to 
the negotiations between a government and a trade union, by assuming that the former 
wants to stabilize prices and employment, and that the latter’s objectives depend on 
the real wage and the employment level. With respect to these variables, our main 
result is negative, as the targets only partially overlap and, more importantly, there is 
a trade-off between them. When starting from any noncooperative outcome, the trade 
union will never gain from cooperating. The government may lose from cooperating, 
or it could simply stay at the initial noncooperative outcome. In some cases, it may 
gain. Hence, efforts that attempt to promote corporatism in such a setting are useless. 
These kinds of round tables are bound to fail.  
                                                 
1 In particular, the “formal reticence” is related by Burda to the remarkable imprecision with which the 
concept is defined. The reticence is even more pronounced with reference to the kind of corporatism in 
which we are interested in this paper. Some exceptions to this reticence are Cubitt (1995), Acocella and 
Di Bartolomeo (2006), and Acocella et al. (2006b). 
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At the same time, however, casual observations show that such cooperative 
agreements are often quite common in practice. We will then also discuss some 
possible explanations that may reconcile the theory with empirical observations.  
In order to highlight those explanations we isolate the problem of coordinating the 
policies of the union and the government from that of coordinating the action of 
unions among them (i.e., the issue of centralization of wage bargaining),2 by 
considering an all-encompassing union. More specifically, if nominal wages are set in 
a decentralized manner by multiple unions, negative externalities arise.3 In this case, 
there may exist room for cooperation between the government and the unions. 
However, once the unions coordinate their policies, the model collapses to the 
standard case investigated here, since unions then internalize the wage externalities, 
and no further externalities exist. We also do not consider the existence of other 
institutions and/or policy instruments, which would introduce other problems of 
coordination.4 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model.  Section 3 
derives various noncooperative solutions. Section 4 concerns cooperative solutions, 
and derives our main result against cooperation in the setting chosen.  We also check 
the robustness of our results for different noncooperative and cooperative solutions. 
Section 5 applies our results to macro-models describing unionized economies. 
Section 6 discusses alternative explanations of the observed cooperative behavior, and 
gives some hints for correct and successful policy recommendations. A final section 
concludes and evaluates our results in the light of other possible explanations of 
corporatism. 
 
2. The model 
We consider a simple unionized economy in which a competitive firm uses labor to 
produce one final good. An all-encompassing monopoly union sets the nominal wage 
level, and a public policy maker (the government) controls aggregate demand. 
                                                 
2 Sometimes corporatism is intended as centralization of wage setting. This is the object of a number of 
contributions (see, e.g., Horn and Wolinsky,1988, Calmfors and Driffill, 1988, Layard et al., 1991, 
Pekkarinen et al., 1992, Teulings and Hartog, 1998, Acocella and Di Bartolomeo, 2004a).  
3 Although the argument is old, it has been fully modeled only recently (see, among others, Cukierman 
and Lippi, 1999; Coricelli et al.2006). 
4 This can explain social pacts in other contexts (see Acocella et al, 2006b). 
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Formally, the simple economic setup is described by an aggregate production 
function, an aggregate demand function, and the preferences of the two players.  
The production function is ( )y f n=  with ( ) 0nf n >  and ( ) 0nnf n <  (subscripts 
indicate derivatives), where y is real output and n is employment. Employment n is 
bounded between zero and n , the exogenously given labor supply. n  is the full 
employment level of n. Competitive profit maximization requires ( )nf n ω= , where 
ω  is the real wage level. Labor demand is given by 1( )nn f ω−= . Aggregate supply of 
output is obtained as 1( ) ( ( ))s ny q f fω ω−= = . Clearly, ( ) 0q <ω ω .  
Aggregate demand is given by a function ( , )dy d p m= , where p is the absolute price 
level,5 and m represents a policy variable (e.g. money supply or fiscal expenditure), 
controlled by the government. We assume that ( , ) 0pd p m < . The sign of 
( , )md p m depends on the exact interpretation of m which we will leave open.
6  
Let w be the nominal wage level. Equilibrium on the output market requires that 
( / ) ( , )q w p d p m= . The wage level w is assumed to be controlled by the trade union, 
while the government controls m. We assume that, for any combination ( , )w m , the 
price level p instantaneously adjusts to realize equilibrium on the output market.  
The preferences of the two players are represented by the following payoff functions. 
The trade union’s payoff function is denoted by ( , )T nπ ω ,  with ( , ) 0Tn n >π ω  and 
( , ) 0T n >ωπ ω  (for a microeconomic foundation, see Oswald (1985)). The 
government’s payoff function is denoted by ( , )G y pπ , with ( , ) 0Gy y p >π and 
( , ) 0Gp y p <π . Both payoff functions are assumed to be strictly concave.  
In all the games we will analyze, we assume that the firm, given a real wage ω ,  
instantaneously adjusts its employment  and its supply of output according to its 
                                                 
5 We assume the parametrically initial price is equal to zero. We can then talk of inflation and current 
prices interchangeably (Cubitt, 1995: 247). 
6 A similar game is described by Cubitt (1995). Our assumption that the trade union does not affect 
aggregate demand is not essential. It is introduced only to simplify the exposition.   
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demand function for labor 1( )nn f ω−=  and its supply function of output ( )q ω .  We 
will not treat the firm as a separate player.7 
 
3. Noncooperative solutions. 
In this section we will analyze three different noncooperative games, based on the 
model of section 2. Before doing that, we will first analyze how the price level p 
depends on the actions taken by the trade union and the government.   
For any combination ( , )w m , we can determine the corresponding price level p that 
realizes equilibrium on the output market. This involves solving the equation 
( / ) ( , )q w p d p m=  for p. This equilibrating price level p can be written as a function 
( , )p w mφ= . Differentiating both sides of the identity  
 ( ( , ), )
( , )
wq d w m m
w m
φφ
⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (1) 
with respect to w, one obtains  
 2
( , )( ) ( , ) ( , )w p w
p w w mq d p m w m
pω
φω φ⎡ ⎤− =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (2) 
so that 2
( )( , )
( , ) ( )w p
q pw m
p d p m wq
ω
ω
ωφ ω= + . 
It follows that ( , ) 0w w m >φ . An increase in the wage level w requires an increase in 
the price level p to restore equilibrium on the output market. As in (2) the sign of the 
LHS must equal the sign of the RHS. It then follows that  
 ( , ) 1w
w w m
p
<φ  (3) 
This implies that a one percent increase in w requires a less than one percent increase 
in p to restore equilibrium.8 If inequality (3) holds, then by changing w the trade union 
does affect the real wage level.     
                                                 
7 Alternatively, firms can be considered as a player (follower) that, given the real wage, sets 
employment and output as a strategic variable. See, e.g., Coricelli et al. (2006). However, the issue is a 
purely terminological one.   
8 It is worth noticing that we have assumed dp(p,m)<0. According to equation (2), if dp(p,m) were zero, 
in equation (3) ‘inequality’ would be substituted by ‘equality.’ In this case the trade union would not be 
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Differentiating the two sides of (1) with respect to m shows that the sign of  ( , )m w mφ  
must be the same as the sign of  ( , )md p m .  
We will now derive the reaction functions of the two players. We start with the 
reaction function of the trade union. For any given value of m, we want to determine 
the corresponding optimal value of w for the trade union.  Using (3) we know that, for 
any given value of m, the trade union can control the real wage level 
( , )
w
w mφ  by 
manipulating w. Through the demand for labor, this control over the real wage level 
also allows control over employment and output. The trade union is then in a position 
to choose n and ω  so as to maximize its payoff ( , )T nπ ω , subject to  1( )nn f ω−= . 
This problem is illustrated in the third quadrant of Figure 1. We denote the solution of 
this problem by * *( , )n ω . Hence,  for any value of m, the trade union will choose that 
value of w such that the resulting real wage equals *ω . Employment and output are 
then given by * 1 *( )nn f ω−=  and * *( )y f n= . In Figure 1 the production function 
(fourth quadrant) transforms employment n into output y. More formally, the reaction 
function of the trade union is given by  
 *( ) |
( , )T
wm w
w m
ϕ ωφ
⎧ ⎫= =⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭  (4) 
We now turn to the reaction function of the government. This player takes the value of 
w as given. Suppose 1w w= . Aggregate supply ( )q ω  is then given by 1( / )q w p . This 
supply function is be drawn as a function of p in the first quadrant of Figure 1. This 
quadrant describes the output market. If the government decides on a value of m, it 
determines the price level 1( , )p w mφ= , and aggregate output 1 1( / ( , ))q w w mφ . The 
government is then in a position to maximize ( , )G y pπ  with respect to y and p, 
subject to 1( / )y q w p= . The solution of this problem for 1w w=  is illustrated in the 
first quadrant of Figure 1. If w  is increased from 1w  to 2w , the constraint in quadrant 
1 shifts to 2( / )q w p , and a new optimal combination of y and p can be determined. 
                                                                                                                                            
able to control the real wage level: a one percent change in w would always lead to a one percent 
change in p, leaving the real wage unchanged. 
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The set of all such solutions for all values of w then traces out the locus BN in Figure 
1. More formally, the reaction function of the government is given by 
 [ ]( ) arg max ( , ), ( / ( , ))GG mw w m q w w m=ϕ π φ φ  (5) 
We now consider three noncooperative games. The first game is a static game in 
which the trade union and the government move simultaneously. The Nash 
equilibrium of this game is given by the strategy combination * *( , )w m , leading to the 
points H and N in Figure 1, where * * *( , )p m wφ= and * * * */ ( , )w w mω φ= . The 
solution of the trade union’s problem in the third quadrant leads to a unique real wage 
level *ω  and employment level * 1 *( )nn f ω−= . Given the action *m  by the 
government, the trade union will determine w such that * */ ( , )w w mω φ= . This occurs 
when *w w= .  The government takes *w as given, and then manipulates m so as to 
find the best point on the supply curve *( / )q w p . This is obtained for the value *m for 
which * * *( , )p m wφ= and * * * *( / ( , ))y q w w mφ= . This Nash equilibrium reveals the 
traditional results of the inflation bias ( *p ) and demand policy neutrality.9  
Consider now the sequential game in which the trade union moves first. For every 
value of w, there is a corresponding supply function in the first quadrant on which the 
government will choose its best point. The trade union will then choose that value of 
w for which the government chooses *y y= . This will be the case if *w w= , so that 
the government chooses the value *m m=  for which * * *( , )p w mφ= and 
* * * *( / ( , ))y q w w mφ= . In Figure 1 this again leads to the points H and N.  
Finally, consider the sequential game in which the government moves first. For any 
value of m, the trade union will choose the value of w such that the real wage equals 
*ω . Real output is then always *y . The government will then choose that value of m 
for which the price level is minimal. In Figure 1 this results in the outcomes H and S.  
As compared to outcome N, the government realizes a first mover advantage. As is 
well-known, the inflation bias in S vanishes as a result of the credible commitment of 
the government not to tolerate any inflation.   
                                                 
9 See Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004b) for monetary policy neutrality in a similar context. 
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Summarizing, all noncooperative games imply the same unemployment *n n− . The 
trade union enjoys a corresponding real wage premium equal to * Cω ω− . ( Cω is the 
real wage at which 1( )Cnn f ω−= .) The inflation bias is zero or positive ( *p ) 
depending on the credibility of the government to support a demand policy that will 
not attempt to inflate the economy in order to raise employment.  
 
4. Cooperative solutions. 
In this section we discuss various cooperative solutions of the same game. All these 
solution concepts make use of the utility possibility curve and of the set of feasible 
payoff combinations. We first specify these notions in the context of our game.  
The utility possibility curve can be constructed as follows. We start by considering 
point H in Figure 1. The corresponding payoff of the union is * * 1( , )
T nπ ω α= . The 
union cannot raise its payoff  further. By contrast, for *n n=  and *ω ω= , an infinite 
set of possible payoffs for the government exists the depending on price level that 
supports the pair * *( , )n ω . Hence, starting from the Nash equilibrium point N ( )1 1,β α  
in Figure 2, it is always possible to increase the government’s payoff along the 
segment NS, without affecting the union’s payoff, by reducing inflation until it is 
zero. This is the case in the commitment solution ( )2 1,β α , in point S.  
From point S (where *n n= , *ω ω= , and 0p = ), further increases in the 
government’s payoff must imply a reduction in the union’s payoff. Indeed,  to further 
increase the government’s payoff, unemployment (and the real wage) must be 
reduced. Employment higher than *n  with zero inflation raises the payoff of the 
government to 3β  and reduces that of the union to 3α . Note that ( )3 3,β α  is Pareto 
efficient: it is on the utility possibility frontier as no Pareto improvements are 
possible. Starting from the payoff 3β , the government’s payoff can be further 
increased to its maximal level 4β  by increasing employment and decreasing inflation 
to the levels n n=  and 0p = , i.e. point B. This will further reduce the union’s payoff 
to 4α .  
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The utility possibility curve is then given by the heavily drawn curve in Figure 2. The 
shaded area is the set Ω  of all feasible payoff combinations. If the payoff functions 
Gπ and Tπ are strictly concave, this set must be convex.  
We now consider various possible cooperative solutions. We start with the utilitarian 
solution. This solution concept is used, e.g., by Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) and 
Cubitt (1995) in a similar context. It is obtained as  
 { }( , ) arg max (1 ) | ( , )G T G TC Cβ α δπ δ π π π= + − ∈Ω  (6) 
where (0,1)δ ∈ measures the bargaining power of the players. In Figure 2 this 
solution is given by the point C ( )3 3,β α , where inflation is zero and employment is 
between *n and n . Comparing this outcome with any of the noncooperative 
outcomes, we observe that cooperation always implies higher employment and lower 
(or equal) inflation. The government is always better off. However, the trade union is 
always worse off:  the real wage ω will always be lower than *ω , while employment 
will be higher than *n . We can conclude, therefore, that there is no scope for 
corporatist policies, in the sense of the utilitarian solution, whatever the 
noncooperative starting point. Such policies can never be beneficial to the trade union.   
We can generalize the utilitarian solution by reducing the set Ω  to a subset FΩ , 
defined as  
 { }( , ) | ,G T G TF π π π α π βΩ = ∈Ω ≥ ≥  (7) 
Here ( , )α β ∈Ω is the disagreement point, i.e., the payoff combination that obtains in 
the case of a breakdown of the negotiations. We could then specify ( , )α β as  the 
noncooperative outcomes 1 1( , )β α  or 2 1( , )β α , i.e., as points N or S. If we take 
1 1( , )β α as the disagreement point, the constrained utilitarian solution is given by 
point S, which increases the payoff Gπ of the government, and leaves the payoff of 
the trade union Tπ unaffected. If 2 1( , )β α is taken as the disagreement point, point S is 
again the constrained utilitarian solution, and no player gains from cooperation.   
The effects of introducing a point of disagreement are clear now. In case the 
government can credibly commit in advance, the constrained utilitarian solution 
coincides with the noncooperative one. In the case of the other two noncooperative 
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games the constrained utilitarian solution only succeeds in reducing inflation, while 
the unemployment rate is unaffected. The government then gains. The trade union is 
unaffected.    
Another cooperative solution is the Nash bargaining solution (1953) in which the 
product 1( ) ( )G Tα απ β π α −− − is maximized over FΩ  for some (0,1)α ∈ . If we then 
specify ( , )α β as 1 1( , )β α  or as 2 1( , )β α , the Nash bargaining solutions coincide with 
the noncooperative solutions.  
Finally, if we use the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (1975) as a cooperative solution 
concept, the solution is again point S in Figure 2, independent of whether we specify 
( , )α β as 1 1( , )β α  or as 2 1( , )β α .  
The above results can be summarized as follows. Starting from any noncooperative 
solution, none of the cooperative solutions improves the payoff of both players. The 
trade union never gains from cooperating. If in the noncooperative stage the 
government moves first, cooperation does not benefit the government either. If the 
government cannot commit in advance, the government only gains in the utilitarian 
solution and in the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.   
 
5. An application to the macro-models describing unionized economies. 
This section compares our results to the literature on standard policy games involving 
union-government interactions.10 We begin by considering a Barro-Gordon model 
with explicit endogenous wage setting, i.e. a simple policy game between the 
government and a representative union of the kind of Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) – 
extensively used in the literature.11 Then we extend our discussion to the case of 
multiple unions emphasized by the recent literature and consider unionized 
segmented-labor markets and monopolistic competition in the goods markets (as in 
Soskice and Iversen 1998; or Coricelli et al. 2006). For the sake of brevity, we expose 
the model in the simplest and most compact way leaving further details to our 
references. In particular, we use as a benchmark Acocella et al. (2006a). Of course, 
                                                 
10 See Cukierman (2004) for a recent survey.  
11 Among a wide number of papers see e.g. Cubitt (1992, 1995), Detken and Gärtner (1994), Lawler 
(2000a, 2000b), Lippi (2002), Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004a, 2004b), and Di Bartolomeo and 
Pauwels (2006). 
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this section does not cover all possible applications. However, it focuses on the more 
interesting case from our perspective, i.e. the case of the macroeconomic models of 
union actions. 
We consider a simple four-equation model.12 Two equations describe the players’ 
preferences and two equations the structural form. Formally, the preferences of the 
government and (representative) union are defined as: 
 2 21
2 2
G p uβπ = − −  (8) 
 ( ) 21
2
T b w p uπ = − −  (9) 
where p is the price level,13 u is the unemployment rate, w p−  is the real wage. The 
government’s payoff  depends on the employment and price deviations from targets 
normalized to zero. The union (or the representative union) seeks to maximize a 
linear-quadratic preference function with the real wage and unemployment rate as 
arguments. The economy is described by: 
 ( )1p w mα α= + −  (10) 
 ( )1
1
u w pα= − −−  (11) 
where ( )0,1α ∈  is the labor coefficient of the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Note that equation (11) is directly derived from the labor demand of the representative 
firm. 
As claimed in section 3, the first best solution of the union can be easily obtained by 
maximizing the union payoff  subject to the “labor demand”: 
 ( )1FBu bα= −  (12) 
                                                 
12 The model is quite general. For further details on its micro-foundations, see Acocella et al. (2006a). 
See also Cubitt (1992) or Di Bartolomeo and Pauwels (2006).   
13 As usual we assume an initial price equal to zero thus we can interchangeably speak of inflation and 
price level. 
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as the real wage and the employment are not independent variables (see equation 
(10)). In this case the union (first best) satisfaction is ( )2 212 1TFB bπ α= −  (in figure 2 
( )2 211 2 1 bα α= − ). 
It is easy to compute the Nash solution of the game, which implies: 
 1Np bβ −=  (13) 
 ( )1Nu bα= −  (14) 
As is well known, the government’s policy is neutral with respect to employment and 
an inflation bias exists. By comparing (12) to (14), the union is clearly able to reach 
its first best solution and there are no incentives for cooperation with the government 
for the reasons discussed above. The losses computed by using equation (13) and (14) 
correspond to point N in figure 2. By considering monetary commitment it is easy to 
verify that point S corresponds to 0Sp =  and  ( )1Su bα= − , and the case of union 
leadership does not differ from the Nash one. 
We now consider the more general case of multiple unions. In this case our results 
might not hold, since, some recent contributions14 show that, if there is a multiplicity 
of unions and product markets are monopolistically competitive, a Barro-Gordon 
framework delivers policy non-neutrality even if unions have standard preferences, 
i.e. they are not inflation averse.  In the economy there is a continuum of monopolistic 
competitive firms distributed on a segment of mass one and n symmetric unions that 
set sector nominal wages; thus, equation (9) must be indexed to distinguish the 
different unions: 
 ( ) 21
2
T
i i ib w p uπ = − −        { }1, 2,...i n∈  (15) 
and a further equation describing the specific-union unemployment rate must be 
added: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1i i
u w p m pηα η α α η α= − − −+ − + −  (16) 
                                                 
14 See Soskice and Iversen (1998, 2000), Coricelli et al. (2006), Cukierman and Lippi (2002), Lawler 
(2005) 
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In equation (15), wi is the wage set by the i union; 1η >  is the degree of monopolistic 
competition, ( )1i jw w wσ σ= + −  is the average wage, where 1nσ −=  is an index of 
the segmentation in the labor market (or union coordination), the general level of 
prices is defined according to the Dixit-Stiglitz’s tradition as 
1
0 ij
p p dj= ∫ .15  
Under the assumption of imperfect competition (i.e. η ≠ ∞ ) the one-to-one 
correspondence between the specific-union unemployment rate and the real wage no 
longer holds. The Stackelberg equilibrium (with unions as leaders) gives:16  
 
( )( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ){ }( )
1 1
0
1 1 1
b
p
α φ αφ σ α φ αφ α α η
η σ α φ αφ ασ φ φ
− − + − + + −= ≥− − + + + +  (17) 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
1 1
0
1 1
b
u
α φ αφ σ α α η
η α φ αφ σ ασ φ
− − + + −= >− − + + +  (18) 
and monetary policy is non-neutral, since ( )( )2
1 1
1 1
α α βφ α β
− −= − +  is a measure of the 
monetary policy stance.17  
From equation (18), it seems that there might be room for cooperation between the 
unions and the government. However, this is not the case if coordination among 
unions is considered. In fact, union coordination implies that 1σ →  and the 
unemployment rate is: 
 ( )1u bα= − , (19) 
which corresponds to equations (12) and (14). Unions as a whole have not interest in 
further cooperating with the government,  since the union coordination internalizes all 
the externalities due to the market segmentations. Put in different words, there are no 
                                                 
15 Equation (16) is the union’s employment function stemming from a traditional labor demand derived 
by real profit maximization assuming a Blanchard and Kiyotaki’s (1987) firm’s demand. It refers to the 
micro disaggregated equilibrium condition, which is fully compatible with the other two macro 
relationships previously described (for technical details, see Acocella et al., 2006a). 
16 In such a model Nash equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium with union leadership are 
different: see Acocella et al. (2006a) for a discussion. This, however, does not affect our argument, 
since union coordination leads to the same outcomes irrespectively of which of the two non-
cooperative solutions is considered. 
17 More precisely it is the coefficient of the reaction function of the government with respect to the 
aggregate nominal wage. 
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cross externalities that can be internalized by cooperation between unions and the 
government. Note also that labor market segmentation is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for union externalities, since if the goods market is competitive, η → +∞  
and the unemployment equilibrium is also given by equation (19). It follows that, if 
unions cooperate, they have no incentive to cooperate with the government. A 
cooperative solution in which each union separately cooperates with the government, 
would be possible, but it would represent a second best solution, since the union 
cooperation also improves the government satisfaction by fully internalizing the 
negative externalities due to the wage decentralization as shown in Acocella et al. 
(2006a). 
In summary, our application describes our results in a widely used context and shows 
that the case of multiple unions can be reduced to that of a monopoly union, at least 
with reference to a standard Barro-Gordon setting. Then the simplifying assumption 
we have used in our model, i.e., that of a monopoly union, is justified, at least in such 
a setting. In fact, a monopoly union solves the main problem arising in a multi-union 
context, i.e., the coordination problem among the different unions. This is of 
overriding relevance with respect to other coordination issues, in particular that 
between unions and the governments. Policy attitudes can have an influence on the 
coordination between unions and the government, but they can never attain the first 
best solution, which can only be obtained if unions cooperate, at least in settings 
similar to that used in this section.18 If the unions can solve the main coordination 
failure arising in the labor market by cooperating, one can doubt if there is any space 
left for cooperating with the government. We will consider this case in the next 
section in relation to the possibility of some unions defecting from their agreement. 
 
6. Possible explanations of corporatist policies  
We have shown that, in the context of macroeconomic stabilization policies, the scope 
for successful corporatist policies is very limited. However, as noted in the 
introduction, casual observation tells us a different story. Corporatist policies have 
been rather common, at least in European economies after the Second World War. 
                                                 
18 The same is true if international wage-setting externalities are considered in a two-country model. No 
cross externalities between unions and governments exist and for the unions all coalitions different 
from that of all the unions, which implies government policy neutrality, are suboptimal (see Acocella 
and Di Bartolomeo, 2004a). 
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Hence, there is the problem of explaining why these policies are indeed so common. 
We will now elaborate on the following possible explanations, while remaining within 
our setting:  
1. Threats. 
2. Side payments.  
3. Issue linkage. 
4. Political exchange. 
5. Delegation of public functions to unions. 
6. Social pacts as a coordination device. 
Some of these explanations – in particular, the first and the second, the second and the 
third – may overlap. There are, however, also differences which justify their separate 
presentation. 
All explanations share common problems. Agreements usually result from a long 
process of negotiations, which also involves strategic behavior by the partners. In the 
course of these negotiations each partner can resort to a number of actions to increase 
his bargaining power. First, a partner may try to hide his “true” preferences, or the 
constraints he faces. In particular, the unions may exaggerate the costs associated with 
wage moderation, whereas employers’ associations and the government will 
overestimate the negative consequences of wage increases on employment. Strategic 
action may also involve threats in order to extract high compensatory payments from 
the opponent.  
In addition, in many cases (in particular, for threats and side payments, but also issue 
linkages) problems of time consistency can arise. As a consequence, in repeated 
games corporatism can prove difficult to be reached if one of the partners in a 
corporatist agreement has a high time preference or does not want to build reputation 
for other reasons. In what follows we focus on one-shoot games and assume that a 
mechanism supporting an agreements exists. 
1. Threats are rather uncommon in social pacts. Sometimes they come from the 
government, and are addressed to social partners (mostly unions) in order to induce 
them to cooperate. The threats refer to the possibility for the government to introduce 
measures harmful for the social partners (taxation, wage restraint, etc.) in case there is 
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no agreement on some kind of wage setting, particularly in order to preserve price 
stability. In some other cases threats come from one of the social partners and are 
addressed to the other social partner or to the government. However, the success of a 
threat strategy depends upon the credibility of the threats. Threats must be credible to 
be relevant. This drastically restricts the cases in which threats support social pacts. 
Probably, threats become credible only in situations of acute governmental crisis.  
The Wassenaar agreement of 1982 in the Netherlands, with the government ostensibly 
present behind the scene, threatening wage controls and other norms (Boeri et al., 
2001: 76), is a perfect example of government threats, tending to facilitate social 
pacts. The pact was signed in a particularly deep economic crisis of the Dutch system 
(see Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1997). By contrast, in Belgium the threat strategy of the 
early 90s was noncredible. This explains why bipartite agreements between labor and 
enterprise organizations failed, and the government finally introduced a wage setting 
regulation in 1993 and 1996, as well as a reduction in social expenditures (Boeri et 
al., 2001: 76-77; Schmitter and Grote, 1997: 193). 
Threats support cooperative strategies in the case of infinitely repeated games under 
some appropriate assumptions about discount factors, as in these circumstances the 
Folk theorem applies. From the pioneering article of Barro and Gordon (1983) it is 
well-known that a cooperative macroeconomic equilibrium can be supported by 
threats. In fact, if the assumptions of the Folk theorem are satisfied, a trigger strategy 
supports the zero inflation equilibrium, but this does not represent the only perfect 
sub-game equilibrium of the case (e.g. a trivial alternative equilibrium is the infinite 
repetition of the non-cooperative static single-period Nash equilibrium). 
Apart from the technicalities, it must be noticed that even if a trigger strategy can be 
used to support cooperation, its practical applications to our case are rather limited. In 
fact, cooperation could lead to no better solution than the non-cooperative Stackelberg 
equilibrium. Thus the only social pacts that can be sustained by a trigger strategy are 
those designed to reduce inflation without affecting the level of employment. This 
seems far to be close to the stylized facts, which often associate the social pact to 
wage moderation to support the employment level. In addition, if the government, by 
(autonomously) committing to a monetary rule, can secure zero inflation with the 
maximum employment, there is no ground for cooperation. For this reason it seems 
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important to explore alternative avenues to support more realistic theoretical 
justifications of the social pacts.   
2. Side payments, in the form of reduced taxes (usually for lower incomes), higher 
social spending, or a relatively contained reduction in social spending can obviously 
make corporatist policies beneficial as long as the gains from cooperation for the 
government exceed the compensation required by the unions. Increases in public 
expenditures (in the form of welfare expenditures, housing programs, etc.) were rather 
common in the pacts of the 1970s (Pizzorno, 1978) and 1980s, but were also granted 
by the government in Finland after 1992. Their controlled reduction was more 
common in the pacts of the 1990s. This was the case, e.g., in Belgium (Visser, 2002: 
10; Schmitter and Grote, 1997: 193). Tax reductions, especially for lower incomes, 
were agreed in Ireland after 1987, and in Finland after 1992 (Boeri et al , 2001: 76).  
This is really a mechanism that could support cooperative solutions. To show the 
possibility for the union to accept a cooperative solution if a side payment is made, we 
must examine the issue in more detail. 
Let us consider the case of a possible given side payment, t, made by the government 
to the union aiming at securing the latter’s agreement about a social pact. We begin by 
considering the simplest case of a fixed-monetary unilateral transfer. Formally, the 
players’ payoffs must be modified as follows: 
 ( )( , , ) ( , )G Gy p t y p g tπ π= −?  (20) 
 ( )( , , ) ( , )T Tn t n h tπ ω π ω= +?  (21) 
The payoffs are now functions also of { }0,t t∈ . For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume a linear-symmetric payoff from the transfer, i.e. ( ) ( )g t h t t= = . The 
assumption will be later relaxed.  
Now the cooperative solutions will be constrained by a new possibility set, which also 
takes account of the fixed transfer. The macroeconomic outcomes in terms of y and p 
deriving from any pair of w and m are independent of the transfer, but the transfer 
changes the final payoff, and therefore also the incentive to adopt a cooperative 
strategy for the two players.  
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We call ′Ω  the set of all payoffs with a given transfer (i.e. for a t t= > 0) and Ω  the 
set without a transfer. The latter corresponds to that depicted in Figure 2. As to the 
former, since the economic outcomes are independent of the transfer (and the utility is 
separable), the set ′Ω  can be easily obtained by shifting the set of payoffs without 
transfer, Ω , to the North-West, to an extent that depends on the amount of t . The set 
′Ω  is represented in Figure 3. Notice that, to each given pair of w and m (and 
therefore also to each triple of ω, y and p), there corresponds in ′Ω  a higher utility (+ 
t) for the union and a lower utility (−t) for the government. More specifically, points 
N’, S’ and B’ correspond, respectively, to the outcomes ω*, y*, p* and a side payment 
of t , to the outcomes ω*, y*, p = 0 and a transfer t , and to the outcomes ω*, y , p = 0 
and a transfer t . Other points correspond to a transfer t  and macroeconomic 
outcomes intermediate between those indicated. If also the case of t = 0 is taken into 
account, we can refer to the set tΩ  = Ω  ∪ Ω ’, which defines the enlarged possibility 
set due to a side payment.  
From our graphical analysis we can draw the following conclusions: 
1. If ′Ω  includes the payoff from the non-cooperative solution, a cooperative 
agreement with a side payment of t  would be always feasible under any kind 
of cooperative solution.  
2. By considering the constrained-utilitarian or the Nash cooperative solution, a 
non-trivial cooperative solution always implies a lower inflation and higher 
employment since the tangency between the utilitarian function or the Nash 
product and the frontier will be on the non-linear side of ′Ω . By contrast, a 
Kalai-Smorodisky solution can be also compatible with a reduction of 
inflation only. 
In Figure 3, point C’ is a cooperative solution which is Pareto superior to both the 
Nash and the Stackelberg ones, and which can be implemented in both the utilitarian 
cooperative function and the Nash product. Notice that the feasibility set (centered in 
N, since no party will accept an agreement leading to a utility lower than the non-
cooperative solution) is not empty as in the case without transfers.  (For the sake of 
simplicity we have only emphasized the feasibility set based on the noncooperative 
Nash solution. The extension to the Stackelberg case is trivial).  
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More generally, if the government can choose the size of the transfer, a utility 
possibility frontier can be obtained by taking the union of all the possibility sets for all 
the possible transfers up to a threshold value ( maxt ). This threshold value is 
determined such that the utility of the government is equal to that achieved in the non-
cooperative case. It follows that the government has no incentive to cooperate for a t > 
maxt .  
Formally, the new utility possibility set is defined as:  
 ( )
max
*
[0, )i t
i
∈
Ω = ∪ Ω  (22) 
where ( )iΩ  is the utility possibility set for a given transfer i (of course, ( )0Ω = Ω  
and ( )t ′Ω = Ω ). Graphically, *Ω  is the envelope of the ( )iΩ  sets and is represented 
in Figure 3 by a dotted line. A cooperative solution always exists (because of the 
continuity) and it singles out the economic outcome and the size of the equilibrium 
transfer. Without loss of generality, we have drawn the figure to get both the 
cooperative Nash and utilitarian solution for t . 
Side payments need not be monetary transfers. E.g., they could also take the form of 
lower taxation which increases workers’ disposable income. In principle, gains and/or 
losses can be in terms of objects different from money, without affecting our analysis.  
3. An explanation of corporatist agreements – which generalizes the side-payment 
solution while being capable of avoiding some of its shortcomings – can emerge from 
issue linkages. The idea of issue linkages was originally formulated with reference to 
the bargaining between multinationals and their host countries (see, e.g., Vaitsos, 
1974: p. 124). It became popular for environmental problems (see Folmer et al., 1993; 
and Cesar and De Zeeuw, 1996). The intuition is that, by interconnecting two or more 
areas of bargaining between two or more agents a cooperative behavior can emerge, 
in which some agents gain on a given issue, whereas other agents gain on another one. 
The linkage between different issues may take the form of a threat to negate some 
existing advantage (Folmer et al, 1993: 315).19 By linking the issues, the agreement in 
which the agents decide to cooperate on them may become profitable to all of them.20 
                                                 
19 Bargaining on environment could be linked to negotiations on trade or arms control or other issues. 
20 Technically the issue linkage enlarges the payoff space and often increases the benefits of 
cooperation for all players. 
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In our context, the basic idea behind issue linkages is to design an agreement in which 
participants do not negotiate on economic stabilization only, of interest mainly to the 
government, but on other issues as well (e.g., taxation policy or pension reform or 
labor market reform, of interest to the social partners).21 
Formally, issue linkage can be modeled as in equations (20) and (21), by assuming 
that { },G Tt t t=  is the vector of the two policymakers’ additional instruments. This 
can be analyzed in a manner similar to the side payment case.22 One could even speak 
of ‘side payments in kind’ in the case of issue linkages (Folmer et al, 1993). The 
effect of issue linkages is in fact that of enlarging the utility possibility set and 
sustaining cooperative solutions. In order to be effective, issue linkage should link an 
issue where the government has a bargaining advantage to the wage negotiations 
since, as shown in the case of side payments, in order to support a cooperative 
solution a non-empty space is needed in the utility possibility set to the northeast of 
the noncooperative threat point.  
Issue linkage (in addition to side payments) was at the basis of corporatist pacts in 
Italy in the 1970s, where unions sought price stability and employment in the 
Mezzogiorno. It was also used in Finland in the early 1990s, where the Government 
promised to abstain from laying off civil servants (Schmitter and Grote, 1997: 190). 
The case of issue linkages can be dealt with in terms entirely similar to those of side 
payments. Instead of a transfer, there will be some other object that can increase the 
union’s satisfaction to the detriment of the government. 
4. A relationship between unions, employers’ associations and governments based on 
political exchange is a specific case of issue linkages, in which the quid pro quo for 
one of the cooperating partners has a truly political nature.23 Quite often, all partners 
                                                 
21 The idea of issue linkage has been introduced also as a way to increase cooperation on issues where 
the incentives to free ride are particularly strong. The purpose of issue linkages has been then to 
determine under which conditions players actually prefer to link the negotiations on two different 
issues rather than negotiating on the two issues separately. This has been investigated in the context of 
endogenous coalition formation (see Carraro and Marchiori, 2003). 
22 Notice that, in the case of issue linkages the vector t corresponds to the values of the two instruments 
geared by both players, whereas in the case of a side payment it would correspond to a unique 
instrument, unilaterally geared by the government to the end of reaching a cooperative agreement.  
23 The meaning we attribute to the term “political exchange” is rather limited, as we refer to situations 
where the quid pro quo for wage moderation lays in the realm of politics, more than in that of 
economics. Other authors speak of political exchange in a more comprehensive way, as they include in 
the counterpart to unions increased public sector expenditure, compensating social policies (which we 
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have an interest in granting or receiving some kind of legitimacy,24 and in avoiding 
exclusion (Streeck, 1998). Or they want to guarantee social cohesion or to ensure 
some common political goal, such as controlling the effects of political shocks 
(liberation from Nazism and Fascism, transition to a democratic regime), or the 
effects of a shift in economic regime (oil shocks, choice of the option of a non-
accommodating monetary regime within the ERM, participation in EMU, entry to the 
EU).25  
The relevance of “political exchange” derives from the fact that considerations other 
than performance may guide the partners of a social pact (Traxler, 2003: 6). “Political 
exchange” is often more of a ‘foundational’ than a “managerial” pact (Karl, 1985), 
and often has a loose (even rhetorical) content (Crouch, 2000a: 216). 
“Political exchange” is a solution intrinsically difficult to be implemented in reality, 
for at least three reasons. First, as we have just said, it often assumes a rhetorical form 
(rather than having a precise technical content). Secondly, the time distribution of the 
costs and benefits to each partner is different and time inconsistency can thus emerge. 
And finally, each partner can only partially control the implementation of decisions 
agreed upon (Regini, 2000: 161). 
One of the first examples of political exchange was given by the post-Nazism and 
post-Fascism social compromises in France and Italy. Another example was the Pacto 
de Moncloa of 1977 in Spain, after the death of Franco. The pact signed in January 
1984 in Italy tried to cope with the (lagged) effects of the second oil shock. The 
unions mainly gained in terms of social cohesion, stemming from reduced inflation 
and from the protection of employment in the Mezzogiorno. Numerous pacts were 
subscribed in European countries after the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s. Here 
                                                                                                                                            
have referred to as cases of side payments), or employment protection (which in our case is the result 
of an issue linkage) (see Visser, 2002: 10). 
24 This is often demanded by unions, particularly in times when the degree of unionization tends to 
decrease. But there are cases in which governments ask for legitimacy, as it happened not only 
occasionally in the cases of France and Italy cited before, but also on a regular basis in Austria, where, 
as declared by the first president of the OGB, Bohm, no government could be formed without the 
support of the unions (Tarantelli, 1986: 183). There are also cases where some kind of legitimacy (i.e., 
controlling the labour force, or preventing unions from deploying ‘whipsawing tactics’ against isolated 
employers) is sought by employers’ associations through social pacts (Traxler, 2003: 3). 
25 In a different context, the importance of the political relationship between the governments and labor 
unions has been stressed also by Alvarez et al. (1991), Detken and Gärtner (1994), and Franzese 
(1999). However, empirical evidence also suggests caution about the size of these effects (see e.g. 
Woldendrop and Keman, 2006). 
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the gains for the unions were mainly political, i.e., easing the road for the construction 
of the European Monetary Union. In some way these types of social pacts were a 
substitute for centralized wage bargaining (Boeri et al., 2001: 75).   
Being a special case of issue linkage, we can repeat for political exchange what we 
said for issue linkages and side payments. 
5. Delegation of public functions to social partners is another explanation of 
corporatist agreements. Organized interests (in particular, in our context, employers’ 
associations and unions) are given the authority to perform functions typical of the 
state (managing the welfare system, defining and implementing labor standards, legal 
enforcement of collective agreements between employers’ associations and unions). 
This solution can be more stable than the previous one, since at least in some cases 
costs and benefits to each partner are synchronous, and each partner can control the 
implementation of the agreements. 
The management of the welfare system by trade unions is rather common in many 
countries. This is the case, since the late nineteenth century, in Germany and 
Belgium.26  This was also the case in Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. It also occurred in France, Italy, Scandinavian and other Continental Europe 
countries, Japan and the U.S. (at the enterprise level) after World War II  (Crouch, 
2000b: 77). Erga omnes clauses are entailed by French and Italian systems. 
Also in this case the formal argument developed for side payments applies. 
6. Social pacts as a coordination device. In a multiple-union context, as we said in the 
previous section, cooperation between the unions enables reaching the first best. A 
monopoly union can attain the same outcome as cooperating multiple unions and, as 
shown in section 3, cooperation between the monopoly union (or the cooperating 
multiple unions) and the government cannot lead to a better outcome. Even if the case 
of a multiple union leads to the same outcome as that of a monopoly union, there is 
however room for cooperating with the government, from the point of view of the 
implementation of the cooperative agreement between the unions. 
                                                 
26 For instance in Belgium refunding of medical expenditures as well as unemployment benefits are 
directly managed by labor unions. 
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In fact, there may be a problem of defection, i.e. of a union having an incentive to 
defect from the agreement with other unions. In this case the intervention of the 
government can guarantee each union against defection by other unions. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have analyzed macroeconomic stabilization policies as a game 
between the government and the trade union. We compared various cooperative and 
noncooperative solutions.  We showed how a simple cooperative utilitarian solution 
can improve the economic performance by decreasing unemployment and reducing 
inflation. However, we have shown that this solution, notwithstanding its wide use in 
the literature, may be unacceptable for the trade union. This union will have no 
incentive to cooperate, even if output stabilization is a public good, i.e., a target of 
both the private and public sector. Cooperation will hurt the trade union. This result 
remains valid if we move to different cooperative solution concepts such as the Nash 
bargaining solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.  
The difficulty to devise a cooperative solution which is beneficial to all partners 
involved has important implications for incomes policies and corporatism. We 
demonstrated that cooperation is possible only in more complex contexts where other 
strategic, economic and political considerations are relevant. This observation is 
confirmed by many practical cases of negotiations between governments and trade 
unions, which often involve threats, side payments, issue linkages, political exchange, 
and delegation of public functions to unions. In a second best fashion, incentives to 
cooperate between the union(s) and the government might also result from the 
existence of multiple distortions as in the case of externalities between more unions in 
a monopolistic goods market or taxation and public expenditures. Acocella et al. 
(2006b) consider a setting where both the union and the government create 
distortions, the union has also a preference for public expenditures and a monetary 
authority operates  In this setting corporatism can cope with a number of externalities 
that are in noncooperative solutions. 
Finally it is worth noting that we have not considered the case of an inflation-averse 
union, i.e., the case where inflation directly enters in the union’s preferences as a 
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negative argument (see e.g. Cukierman and Lippi, 1999).  When inflation is low, 
however, this case is rather unrealistic and can be hardly justified. It acquires 
relevance in cases of galloping inflation or hyperinflation, which, apart from 
efficiency considerations, usually are situations of social unrest and clashes. In this 
paper we have restricted our analysis to the traditional simple case of a monetary 
economy with a competitive good market.  
We have not considered active behavior of employers’ associations in our model. This 
would increase the possibility of side payments and issue linkages. However, it does 
not change our basic results in a substantive way. A more promising prospect could 
emerge in considering the cooperation between the firm and the union (with an 
efficiency wage solution), together with the cooperation between the union and the 
government. 
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